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Abstract 
 
The incompetence of privatized firms within emerging economies will lead great attention to the 
importance of agency theory and asymmetry information theory and their impact on the 
performance of privatization. A traditional agency problem (perquisite consumption and 
entrenchment) is intensified by the weak governance and unique agency problem 
(expropriation) is created due to the limited protection of minority share holders. We suggest 
that the post privatization performance can be enhanced by using the appropriate ownership, 
management and corporate structures that mitigate agency problems in the context of weak 
governance.  
     The main purpose of privatization is to provide with the private delivery of public 
services and in this case, asymmetric information can impact on both efficiency and quality of 
outcomes. This paper discusses the agency problem and the inherent asymmetric information in 
the process of privatization.  
     We examined the impact of good governance on the performance of 20 firms that were 
privatized by the sale of shares. As the state ownership of these firms is determined exogenously, 
existing managers become owners or are replaced. Moreover due to the limited number of 
skilled managers in the market economy in Bangladesh, we avoid the selection problem 
presented in the market where new managers may be better suited than existing managers to 
manage their firm. Controlling for initial conditions and using several measures of the firm’s 
performance, we found that the performance of privatized firms were positively related to entry 
of new managers and similarly negatively related to holding shares of the state. 
In our study first we introduced the MNR (Megginson, Nash and Randnbrogh, 1994) 
methodology. For our analysis we used Wilcoxon signed rank test to compare the financial and 
operating data of 2008 and 2010 after the privatization to evaluate the performance. Although 
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this methodology was applied in many studies but in this case it had its shortcoming because in 
our study we failed to used facts and statistics of pre privatization era. MNR method was not 
perfectly appropriate to access the performance due to a lack of sufficient historical data. To 
deal with this issue, we introduced the DID (difference in difference) methodology to compare 
the data of SOEs and privatized firms from the homogeneous group, that means we did the 
comparison of performance and analysis of data from the same group of sector. 
     The DID methodology showed that the post privatization performance of firms 
significantly improved in terms of profitability and productivity. This paper exposed an 
important impact of governance on firm’s performance. Finally, we found that overall 
performance of firms which was privatized by sale of share increased significantly.       
 
Key words: Agency problem, asymmetry of information, competency leadership, privatization 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction     
Privatization is an important policy to vitalize state owned Enterprises (SOEs) in many 
countries as well as Bangladesh by managerial and governance changes. In general, 
privatization policies are introduced because of two most important reasons. Firstly, in most 
of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) SOE’s performance was not satisfactory at all and 
secondly the government tries to minimize the fiscal budget on those SOEs. That is why 
privatization has become so popular in the LDCs. However, many privatization cases in 
Bangladesh did not bring any significant changes in corporate management of newly 
privatized firms due to a number of reasons such as political pressure from government, 
poor remuneration for management and improper monitoring systems for managers. A 
number of problems were observed in many privatization programs in LDC.     
     Whether privatization brings benefit or improves performance of privatized firms or 
not, is a controversial issue in the field of privatization. Some of the scholars argue that 
privatization should improve the performance of firm while some are of the opinion that 
privatization may bring efficiency in the firm but there is a high probability of losing social 
benefits. For example, World Bank (WB) has been encouraging the privatization in the 
LDCs countries by showing a number of efficiency of post privatized firms in their report. 
World Bank has been claiming that privatized firms are able to enhance their productivity 
and functionality which brings more transparency and efficiency for the privatized firms. 
This paper initiates from my personal interest in the restructuring efforts in transitional 
economies in Bangladesh. More distinctively, the process of privatization in Bangladesh has 
encouraged me to evaluate their nationalized and privatization policies from the point of 
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view of new theoretical perspective. Under this background of my interests, anyone can find 
that my model will be best approach and more applicable with new theories to centrally 
designed economies. 
     In this perspective, this investigation would like to shed light on the performance of 
post privatization of few firms in Bangladesh in order to compare the performance report 
published by the World Bank. Thus, the main objective of this study is to evaluate the 
performance and efficiency of privatized firms in Bangladesh. In addition to this, this study 
aims to investigate the organizational changes of privatization as well as the process of 
implementation of privatization. Furthermore, it will focus on the labor-management 
interaction in the administration as an attempt to scrutinize the influence of leadership styles 
of at various management levels. 
     During privatization ownership transferred from public to new owner and creating 
new agency problem. Agency theorist must argue that new owner will give priority to 
managerial perquisite consumption and entrenchment problem (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 
1998). To refer this problem newly formed owner require agency cost to monitoring the 
action of management or have to provide incentive alignment to confirm the target of 
similarity between principal and agent (Eisenhardt 1989). Many researchers also have 
predicted that good governance mechanism in management, such as board of directors 
(BODs), managerial labor market and withdrawal of threats, can reduce many agency 
problem. Scholars have divided this mechanism in to two group’s internal (organization 
based) and external (market based) control mechanism (Walsh & Seward 1990). This gives 
raises the fist research question  
 How do the internal and external factors effect on the performance of the 
privatization firms and the management change system? 
     Our main objective here is to identify both traditional and unique agency problem in 
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privatized enterprise because researchers in this field often neglect the role of agency 
relationship with in weak governance perspective. They have ignored the different 
ownership structure to resolve traditional and unique agency problem. To avoid this 
problem, we can use the effectiveness of management in ownership structures to optimizing 
risk bearing, incentive alignment and monitoring, adapting those in weak governance 
perspective. This arise the second research question:  
 Which ownership structure in management system will reduce the traditional 
as well as unique agency problem and enhance the privatized firm’s 
performance? 
     Based on this background and objective of this study, it attempts to answers the 
following research questions: 
 What is the pre and post privatization performance of the firms in terms of 
profitability, capital investment, leverage and efficiency in asset utilization? 
Simultaneously asses the fiscal effect? 
     Although, there are a number of researches on the privatization of Bangladesh, but as 
the author’s knowledge goes, there is literature which investigated exclusively the changes 
in the management system in post privatization period. This research aims to evaluate the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the style of management between pre and post privatization 
period in the context of Bangladesh. In addition to this, our research compares the 
performance of twenty different privatized firms from different sectors in order to see the 
different industrial sectors. Result of this report will be exclusively useful for the policy 
maker of the Bangladesh to design an appropriate policy for privatization. Furthermore, this 
thesis investigates the necessary conditions that are important for privatization which can be 
used by the policy maker in future privatization process. Finally, findings of this study also 
could be used for many other privatized firms of developing countries.   
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Chapter Two 
 
2. Research Background 
2.1 Privatization and its development 
Concept of privatization initiates momentum over the world wide in recent decades and 
makes a completely new trend in the area of economic policy. The contemporary concept of 
privatization as economic policy was first introduced in Federal Republic of German in 
1957. At that time government ultimately sold the majority share of Volkswagen to private 
sector. The next significant movement in privatization comes in the 1980s with Margaret 
Thatcher’s privatization policy of Britain Telecom and Chirac’s privatization policy in 
financial sector in France. After this privatization spread over with other continents as Japan 
and Mexico and specially privatized government own communication companies 
(Megginson, Nash, Randenborgh, 1996). Another most important remarkable role of 
privatization process world wide has been the fall of communist countries in Europe and 
former Soviet. In the case of privatization most successful country is Chili and Argentina. In 
recent time, many countries like China, Cuba and India start privatization though didn’t 
achieve the expected level of success. As well as many other developing countries 
inaugurated privatization process like Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Vietnam etc in the hope of 
stimulating economic growth.    
     Bangladesh is trying to cope with privatization over three decades. This policy has 
been influence by number of economic and extra economic components. Bangladesh 
Privatization Board describes (2006) providing enormous incentives for encourage private 
investment. The Revised Investment Policy designed in 1975 for putting much emphasis in 
the development of private sector. They also analyze setting up Disinvestment Board and a 
 13 
total of 255 SOEs were privatized in between 1975 to 1981 and about 115 of these SOEs, 
were divested to the Director General of Industries (DGI). The NIP (New Industrial Policy) 
of 1982 indicates a major move towards privatization where total of 222 SOEs was 
privatized. 
     Centre for Policy Dialogue(2001) assess In the year 1993 the establishment of the 
Privatization Board and after the Privatization Commission in 2000, 74 state owned 
enterprises were privatized of which 54 were privatized through outright sale and 20 
through offloading of shares. The Privatization activities are gaining momentum. This 
reflects the growing participation of the private sector in privatization. 
     According to Privatization Commission Journal (May, 2003) the most important 
move in the privatization process occurred in 1982 the NIP (New Industrial Policy) was 
announced. The government introduced fundamental changes of the adoption of different 
promotional measures and the industrial policy environment, redesigned to accelerate the 
pace for private sector-led industrial growth. Large number of industries in the jute as well 
as cotton textiles sectors (a number of27 textile mills 33 jute mills) were returned to their 
owners under the auspices of the NIP. For the purpose of encourage foreign private 
investment, the Foreign Private Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act of 1980 was 
established and a “One-Stop” service agency, for example Board of Investment (BOI), was 
set up, commencing it starts operations in January 1989. 
Privatization & its development 
 
 
      World wide            Bangladesh 
 
German 1957                             Disinvestment board (1975-1981) 
                          255 SOEs privatized 
      Volkswagon                               
                                                 Director of investment 1982 
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  Margaret Thatchers 1980                               115 SOEs privatized 
 
 Japan & Mexico                                  New industrial policy 1982 
                                                     222 SOEs privatized 
   Chili & Argentina                                                      
                           Act of 1980 established  
        China                                       Board of investment, 1989 
                                                                      
India, Pakistan, Srilanka                                Privatization board, 1993 
                                              74 SOEs privatized, among this 54  
                                               firms sale ownership, 20 by IPO 
 
2.2 Type of Privatization in Bangladesh                    
Privatization refers to the process of transferring property from public ownership to private 
and simultaneously shifting the management of service or activity from government to 
private sector. It is much more than selling a firm to a highest bidder (World Bank 1995b). 
From the structural point of view, it represents marketization of firms and this can be 
achieved by changing ownership, organizational change or by change in operation 
(Ramanadhan, 1993). It is basically a political as well as economical and commercial 
process and gives rise to the needs of: 
 Balance and well organized privatization to earn the political goal 
 Selection of firms in a way that can achieve the political target. 
Types of privatization in Bangladesh 
 
 
 
 
Complete      Privatization         Contracting       Franchising     Open 
Privatization    of operation         out               ex. DESCO   competition 
ex. Kohinoor   ex. Jamuna          ex. Railway                     ex. BTTB 
Chemical      bridge              ticket sale                       T&T board 
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Those goals falls under two broad sorts of ways: macro economical (Social) and micro 
economical (firm-specific) goal. According to the policy and guideline of International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB), privatization only deemed to be occurring 
when the government reduces the shareholding to 25% (World Bank 1995b).      
     Privatization can be partial or complete and may also carry the conditions of change 
management. Privatization is the process of mechanism by which government reduce its 
direct involvement with the economy. Privatization covers a large scale of state operation, 
management and ownership arrangement. There is no specific or unique formula for 
privatization. According to the policy statement of privatization, following two methods of 
systems of privatization usually applied by privatization board in Bangladesh. 
 
2.2.1 Sale by International Tender 
     Foreign and local buyers may participate in these tenders. Association of workers, 
employees and officers of tendered firm also can participate to buy the enterprise. The 
authority would prefer to use employee stock option programme (ESOP) if the workers of 
the tendered firm want to purchase it. In case of Bangladesh direct sales of SOE has been 
the dominant method of privatization. Generally direct sales have been more common than 
other methods (like public offering share).During 1980-1997, all over the world 831 
privatization cases involved with direct sales of SOEs valued $ 176 billion US dollar 
compared to 630 cases of privatization through share issued (Megginsion, W.L., 1998). 
 
2.2.2 Sale by public offer of shares 
    By using this method of privatization policy, government-owned shares in different 
enterprise and share of SOEs converted in to public limited company, may be sold to the 
public limited company to general public through the stock exchange or directly.     
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   During our study we identify few types of privatization which may be considered in 
Bangladesh. Five forms of privatization are classified in Bangladesh, these forms of 
privatization are:  
• Complete Privatization,  
• Privatization of Operations  
• Contracting out,  
• Franchising,  
• Open Competition.  
 
1.  Complete Privatization 
     Complete privatization means that sale of government assets to the private sector. 
Public run industries have generally been completely privatized through one of three main 
ways among this the first way is share issue privatization. The public enterprise sells shares 
that can then be traded on various stock markets. The second way of privatization is asset 
sale. In this way, the whole asset is sold to an investor and is usually done by auction. The 
third way is voucher privatization, in which shares of ownership of public enterprises are 
distributed among the citizens for a low price or without price, only socialist country uses 
this type of privatization.    
 
2.  Privatization of Operations 
     The privatization of operations refers to the transfer of public managerial and 
operational responsibilities to private sector firms. By this arrangement, the enterprise in the 
private generates income through the collection of fees from individual customers of the 
public asset. Such type of arrangement can be seen in transactions concerning the operation 
and maintenance of toll roads and bridges, such an example is Jamuna Bridge. 
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3. Contracting Out 
    Contracting out is the creation of specific services by a private enterprise under a 
contract.  In this scenario, the private sector enterprise directly paid through taxes or 
collection of user fees by the government for their services. This types of services have been 
privatized through one kind of agreement include security services, data processing services, 
and consulting services for numerous professions.  
   
4. Franchising 
     Franchising is an exclusive right to provide services within a specific region to a 
private enterprise by a public unit. The private enterprise generates income by collecting 
user fees.  Utilities such as electricity, gas, and water service could also fall under this 
category, such as an example like Dhaka Electric Supply Company DESCO. 
 
5. Open Competition 
     Open competition is same as pure competition; many private firms are allowed to 
compete for customers within a governmental jurisdiction. This kind of privatization usually 
can be applicable in telephone and internet service providers, such an example is T & T 
board.  
     In short, privatization mechanism can be composite of three basic elements of 
component such as polices, measures and strategies. As a policy matter, state with drawl 
their direct interventions form the economy of the country. As a measure its affect the 
shifting of asset or business activities and performance implementation agriculture, 
manufacturing, selected public services and utilities, from the public to private sector. And 
as a mechanism of   strategy it can take the form all of the following: complete 
privatization, privatization of operation, leasing arrangement, contracting out and 
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liquidation of enterprise in order to achieve a greater degree of performance and capability. 
 
2.3 Historical back ground of privatization in Bangladesh 
After liberation economy of Bangladesh was started dominate by private sector. The new 
government, led by father of nation Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and was committed to 
socialism and nationalizing industrial sector. By 1974, public sector received control over 
350 largest SOEs, which were almost the whole industrial sector. Nevertheless, their 
inefficiency negatively impact on the public investment (Ahmed, 1976a; Ghafur, 1976, 
World Bank 1993) and loss occurred 30% of yearly project aid. This reinforces the hand of 
opponents of the public sector. A military coup overthrew Mujib Government by 
assassination, father of nation in August 1975. Three month later, another coup and General 
Ziaur Rahman came to power and got full control in 1977. Zia government (BNP) initiated 
liberal economic policy and return small Bangladeshi owned companies to their owners. A 
disinvestment board was established and 255 SOEs were privatized between 1975 to 1981 
(World Bank, 1997). Military leader was following the western policies, especially 
American and British ideology of Reaganism and Thatcherism, to legalize their 
undemocratic action.  
     In 1982, General Ershad came to the power; seek for western support and adopting 
their recommendations to privatized SOEs. Donor agencies have given loan facilities to 
privatization program and 27 textiles, 33 jute mills were returned to their owners. However, 
until 1986, the range of privatization was very inadequate. The number of privatization was 
large but all are small size of industries, for example below Tk. 2 billion to government 
receipts and it was easy to privatize. 
     In 1986 industrial policy has revised and many of SOEs became holding company 
(through joint stock Company) by selling shares under 51-49 plan.  
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Historical background 
 
                              Independent 1971 
 
            First government led by father of nation Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, 1972 
 
         Due to commitment to Soviet union Govt. own all most 90% Enterprise by 1974 
 
                    Father of nation assassination by military, 1975  
        
General Zia take power 1977, liberalized economic policy, 1975-1981 205 SOEs privatized  
 
   Another cope, 1982 General Ershad came to power, 27 textile & 33 Jute mills privatize  
 
 1986 industrial policy revised (NIP), SOEs privatized by issue of IPO (51-49 partnership) 
 
1993 privatization board established, 74 SOEs privatized, 54 sale ownership & 20 by IPO  
 
  1996 Awami League govt. promises donor agencies &1996-2001, 13 SOEs privatized 
 
  Presently most of the privatized SOEs owned by family, finally Family Capitalism 
established in Bangladesh 
     In 1993, the government established Privatization Board to accelerate the 
privatization process. Nevertheless, from 1991 to 1996, the board was able to privatize only 
13 enterprises. However, in 1996 Awami League government took control of the country 
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and promised to donor agencies to make stronger privatization process and from 1996 to 
2001 only 9 small SOEs were fully privatized. Finally again this program fell short of 
expectation. The World Bank (1995) mentioned that without maximization of profit no firm 
could be competitive and private firm in Bangladesh had greater profitability than SOEs.  
     Presently, most of the business in Bangladesh are closely held by family circle and 
the change of ownership in privatization strike an important change and indicate the 
emergence, which is elementary of a market for corporate control management. Actually 
new ownership of the organization can create new management, while under public 
ownership there is no market for corporate governance because managers are rotated and 
transferred inside the organization or from bureaucracy to enterprise as a function of job 
rotation. 
     Research of post privatization performance of enterprises is still very few. Sobhan 
and Ahsan (1984) found that in jute mills sector, the performance of privatized mills were 
not better than the public mills. They conclude that privatized mills failed to enhance their 
financial performance (Ahmed, 1994). State own enterprises (SOEs) was holding 92 percent 
of total fixed asset of industrial sector. However, this enormous number of SOEs caused a 
great burden for the government of Bangladesh (Ahmed, 1976b, Ghafur,1976; World Bank 
1993). After assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman the new military government was 
strongly influenced by the World bank and IMF, turned increasingly to market linearization 
and privatization (Ahmed, 1976a; Ghafur, 1976). Many studies shows that in LDC`s 
management controls upon SOEs becomes irrelevant only for huge political pressure on 
decision making in commercial consideration and by over looking the formal accountability 
system (Jones and Sefiane, 1992; Quibrahim and Scapens, 1989; Wickramasinghe, 1996). 
The same occurrence happened in the Bangladeshi SOEs (Alam, 1990, 1997). Finally it was 
needed to privatize, World Bank (1993, 1995) and IMF have argued for an `enabling 
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environment` for privatization in Bangladesh to build up accountability, transparency and 
efficiency. Privatization process continued from 1972 to 1996, it’s a long period of time. As 
state-run operations in Bangladesh, the rigid organizational culture and the bureaucratic 
system in administration make it impossible to change overnight.  
     In the year 1978 military government come in to the power, it’s inherent an economy 
that devastated by year of political imbalances, negligence’s of economy and 
mismanagement. The massive damage to industrial sector, infrastructure, agriculture was 
such that it’s require long time to repair and recover these to satisfactory productive level. 
Moreover, due to destruction of the economic base, large number of skilled professionals, 
expertise of different sectors and experienced administrators left the country only for fear 
from brutal command. The remaining managers were deeply demoralized by long period of 
misruled, insecurity and economy hardship. In this situation, the poor performance of SOEs 
becomes a budgetary burden for government.   
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Chapter Three 
 
3. Literature Review 
Firms can be graded the length of a spectrum according to the cost of intervention, and 
private firm is situated at one end of the spectrum on the other hand public firms position is 
on other end. In between this interval there is various numbers of mixed firms with different 
cost of intervention. By considering this entire thing the microeconomic literature about 
privatization can be divided in to two distinct parts-one consider the agency structure inside 
the enterprise and other one analyzing the information asymmetry inside the privatization 
and privatized enterprise. But we will consider the underlying connection between this two.      
There are a number of literatures which deal with the causes of inefficiency in the 
privatization sector. The two most important and dominant reasons which are described by 
the researchers are principal –agent problem and asymmetric information problem.  
     In this study, we identified the asymmetric information problem between a principal 
and agent which may hamper the performance of newly privatized firms. Since, an agent 
has more information regarding the production const than principal, an agent may 
manipulate the production system for the company.  
 
3.1 Agency theory perspective 
One of the main objectives of privatization is to promote work incentives in public firms. 
Holmstrom (1979) explained the principal agent problem in the context of privatization. 
According to him, a contract can be made between principal and agent where principal will 
motivate the agent to perform his best on behalf of the principal. Although, the principal is 
exposed to some degree of risk, if the contract is compatible for both parties it will 
maximize the benefits of firms and both parties will also have the probability to maximize 
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their benefits. After Holmstrom, Baron & Myerson (1982) made the first initiate to model 
information in a regulatory framework. 
     Privatization impact on emerging economy and are resulting the transformation of 
ownership from public enterprise to private and therefore creates the agency problem of 
managerial perquisite consumption (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998) and entrenchment (Walsh 
& Seward 1990). Perquisite consumption refers to the short-run cost increased activities 
designed by managers to increase non salary income. Entrenchment refers to the action of 
activities that reduces the managerial capability and decrease the control mechanism 
designed to regulate the management (Walsh and Seward 1990). We assert that the nature 
and harshness of agency problem in private enterprise in emerging economy differ from 
developed economy and limited the success of privatization. Researcher recommended that 
the agency problem can be solved in different ways among which the main threes are: 1. 
enhancement of incentive arrangement between agent and principal 2. Minimizing risk 
associated properties between principal and agent 3. Properly monitor of principle over 
agents. Such agency solutions rely, on the competent governance perspective established in 
most developed economies (Holl & Kyriazis 1997, Kochhar 1996). Traditional agency 
solutions that diminish the agency problem of the strong governance in the perspective of 
developed economy but might not be effectively works in the weak governance perspective 
for the emerging economies. However, traditional agency problem, in the weak governance 
for the perspective of emerging economy creates a number of alarms concerning to 
expropriation of minority shareholders (Cho, 1990). Expropriation takes place in the weak 
governance perspective, when the majorities of owners presume to control over firms and 
deny the minority owners right from the return of their investment (Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, 
1988). That is why, traditional agency problems support principal-agent object disparities, 
which are replaced by unique agency problems arising from principal-agent objective 
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disparity. So, the agency theorist offering solutions in the perspective of developed 
economy do not consider the unique solution.  
   In this context we can argue that only efficient governance system can provide 
privatized firms with a wide structural adjustment program which will reduce agency 
problem and gives incentives for managerial risk taking (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998). 
Good governance mechanism in management can reduce the agency problem and this 
mechanism can be divided in to two ways: 1. internal control mechanism and 2. External 
control mechanism 
 
3.1a Internal Control Mechanism 
Internal control mechanism refers to the monitoring of the BODs and mutual monitoring by 
top level management (Walsh and Seward 1990). BODs can assist shareholders to assess the 
performance of management and able to organize management perquisite consumption and 
entrenchment by providing short term (reward system) and long term (changing corporate 
structure) solution (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998, Walsh and Seward 1990). Usually internal 
control mechanism is linked in German-Japanese model where share holds are directly 
utilizing BODs to control management and in this case external control mechanism (like 
hostile takeover) is completely absent (Frank & Mayer, 1993, Prowse, 1994).  
 
3.1b External control mechanism    
External control mechanism refers to the hostile takeover, alternative competition and legal 
protection of minority share holder privileges (Walsh and Seward 1990). It causes firm 
vulnerable to market interference, and incentives are provided for capable outsiders to take 
control of firm when firm is undervalued. The effectiveness of this mechanism is assisted 
by publicly availability of transparent measures of firm’s performance (Prowse, 1994). 
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Therefore external control mechanism can reduce traditional agency problem by proper 
monitoring of executive behavior, while managers can be replaced because of hostile 
takeover and merger. Strong external control mechanism is usually found in 
Anglo-American model of corporate governance. Where shareholders are inactive in 
compares to internal control mechanism and depends on external corporate control 
mechanism (such as hostile takeover and merger; Bhide 1994).  
 
                                                    Enhance incentives between 
                                                    Principal and agent        
 
 
  Managerial perquisite consumption    perquisite consumption     Solved by       minimizing risk associate 
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       Walsh, 1990 
                           Soled by Unique solution 
 
                             Good governance (Gedajlovic, 1998) 
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3.2 Asymmetric Information in Privatization 
The role of asymmetric information became an integral part of the discourse on 
privatization in 1987. Stiglitz and Weiss (1987) first identified the asymmetric information 
problem in their revolutionary work “Market for Lemons”. This asymmetric information 
problem is also exclusively applicable in the case of privatization process. They argue that, 
government intervention can cause the changes of performance of privatized firms. 
Transaction cost is one of the important parameter to distinguish between public and private 
enterprise (Shapiro & Willig, 1990).     
 
3.2.1 Information asymmetry from principle-agent conflict 
Information asymmetry is the basic core element of principal-agent theory and this agency 
relationship exists when government (principal) provides vendors (agent) for a specific job 
in which vendors have expertise (Larbi, 2006; Finkly, 2005; Brown et. al. 2006; Halachmi, 
2000). Principal-agent theory can determine problem when the desires goal of principal and 
agent are in conflict and it is difficult for principal to verify performance of agent. Such 
type of difficulties arises due to incomplete information; ignore contract and improper 
monitoring (Gauld, 2007). This theory involve in cooperative behavior that provides 
guideline how both parties can develop relationship to maximize probability to achieve 
target of principals goal. The main assumption is agent does not share principals goal and 
thus will not complete satisfactorily if left to its own mechanism, a behavior referred to as 
shirking. It is practically impossible for agent to remove shirking (Hoque, 2005). In fact 
shirking exists irrespective of the degree of monitoring (Kettl, 1993). Thus main purpose is 
not remove shirking completely but reduce to a level that ensure the goal of a principle can 
be achieve. 
     Information asymmetry occurs when agent has better relevant information than 
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principle. Such asymmetric information occur in respect of possible quality and cost 
configuration of project in the contracting process (Taylor,2005; Finkle, 2005). This raises 
the probability that agent can behave in way enhance opportunism (Bessire,2005). Result of 
such opportunism is agency cost and this cost arises when agent acts self interestingly with 
bad intension. Agency cost identify to address contractual difficulties which arises from 
asymmetry of information and anticipated agent opportunism.                  
     Agency cost cover all cost associated with actual opportunism and formulate 
mechanism to follow up agent activities and to ensure that agent acting as per contract 
which is stipulated in deed (Wankhade & Dabade, 2006). This may provide incentives to 
monitoring performance of agent. Studies suggested that incentive based deed can be use to 
motivate agent positively. When risk is moderate, more incentive should pay to motivate 
agent and to perform on behalf of principles best interest (Zhao, 2005). However, if the 
level of risk increases, more fixed fees and less incentive may be more effective. Two main 
theme of agency problem is moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard refers to the 
lack of efforts of agent since it is impossible for principle to monitor all agents’ 
performance (Gauld, 2007; Brown at. al. 2006, Turner & Mullar, 2005). Adverse selection 
refers to the misrepresentation of ability of agent to principle. The agent may claim certain 
skill when he is selected to perform assign jobs. Adverse selection arises because it is 
difficult for principle to measure the performance of agent at the time of selection (Nyman 
et. al., 2005; Zeng et. al., 2007).  
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                                      Conflict principal & agent, Gauld (2007) 
 
                Incomplete                 Ignore                 improper  
               Information                 contact                monitoring  
 
                                      Combining this three called shirking 
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        Reporting                     Budget       Behavior base                 Outcome base 
                                        (Long-term relation)          (Short-term relation) 
 
    Due to unobservable decision (moral hazard or adverse selection) principle can 
determine agent performance through incurring agency cost, by query of information 
system such as budgeting, reporting, board of director and additional layer of management 
(Zeng et. al., 2007; Wankhade and Dabade, 2006). Such investments reveal agent behavior 
to principle. The agency theory tries to do the most favorable contract between principle 
and agent which is based on behavior or outcome. It presume an easily determined outcome, 
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and an agent who is more risk adverse than the principle (Brown et. al., 2006; Nyman 
2005).  
     Finally it presume that when principle and agent engage in long term relationship, 
principle will get chance to know more about agent, there by reduce information asymmetry. 
Such a case behavior base contract is appropriate. On the other hand in short term agency 
relationship between agent and principal it will be better to select the outcome base contract 
and it will be more attractive. As a result, the length of agency relationship positively 
involves with behavior based contract and negatively related to outcome base contract 
(Zhao, 2005; Gauld, 2007;).   
 
3.3 Management Anchor Competency (MAC) Model     
Competency in general is the ability of an individual to use the acquire knowledge in a 
complex and unpredictable situation (Perrenoud1997, Svetlik 2005). Gurban (2003) defines 
the competency as the use of knowledge and other capabilities that can be used to perform 
an appointed task, or of a certain role in the business process. Competency (MAC) includes 
knowledge, capabilities, expertise, behavioral characteristics, motives and values etc. In our 
research we will use the management competencies, which will focus on different level of 
management. Competency is an important element of corporate management and similarly 
corporate parent is integrals part of corporate management. Corporate parent can take value 
adding activities in different ways to enhance the performance of business unit by reducing 
agency problem. Principals of privatized firms can minimize agency problem by 
governance mechanism. Privatization is the result of wide verity of ownership structure that 
may vary between and inside national boundaries (Frydman et. al. 1997). We will examine 
the fundamental element of ownership structure and will try to asses the ability of reduce 
traditional agency problem in the weak governance perspective. Competency is competitive 
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strategy by which firms increase profitability and able to decide strategic decision.  
    
3.3.1 Post privatization ownership structure (MAC)        
In our literature review of privatization we identified six fundamental type of ownership 
which may occur independently or combined. Namely 1. foreign investors (multinationals), 
2. local individual investors (citizens) 3. local institutional investors (Banks) 4. managers 
(top management) 5. employees ( except top management) and 6. states (DeCastro and 
Uhlenbruck 1997). We can segregate those six in to two groups one is insider, owner of this 
group continuing involvement after privatization. Another group is outsider, and owner of 
this group are not engage with the firm prior to privatization. Insider refers to employees, 
managers and state, whereas outsider refers to foreign, local and local institutional 
individuals. Beside this we can also design group of ownership that focus on dominant and 
distributed ownership. In the case of dominant ownership refers to majority equity 
ownership, while distributed ownership refers to non majority. 
 
3.3.2 Post privatization ownership structure (MAC) as a function of ownership type 
 
Ownership type Dominant > 50% of equity Distributed (minority owner)  
 Outsider 
Foreign 
Local institutional 
Local individual 
 
 
 
 
 Insider 
State 
    Manager 
    Employee 
 In this case there is one 
outsider dominant that 
possess equity  
 
 Equity is controlled by 
one hand of entity   
 
 
 There is one dominant 
that control the possess 
interest of equity 
 
 in this case there is multiple 
outsider dominant that 
possess equity controlling 
interest 
 within each ownership 
equity is controlled by one 
entity 
 
 There are more than one, 
that means multiple 
dominants that possess 
equity controlling 
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 Within this ownership 
type equity is controlling 
by multiple entities 
 
 Within each ownership 
equity distributed among 
several entries.  
 
Management anchor competency (MAC) 
 
 
                                  State 
                                 
                    Insider  
                                  Manager     
 
                                  
              Decastro,1997                 Employee 
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Burban, 2003 
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               (Burns, 1978) 
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3.4 Competency Leadership 
3.4.1 What are competencies?  
Competencies are fundamental characteristics that lead to superior performance in an 
individual’s job. They include qualities, skills, attributes and traits that help people to be 
successful. Competencies go beyond the traditional focus on academic qualifications, 
technical skills and experience, providing a framework for assessing and developing 
deeper-seated personal skills. Competencies are also capable of being developed in people 
rather than being fixed and immovable. Each competency is broken down to levels, each of 
which gives an illustration of what the competency might look like. This is done because it 
is not as simple as either having or not having a competency - different jobs will require 
different levels of complexity of the same behavior.   
 
3.4.2 Definition of Competency Leadership  
Leadership is one kind of performance of an individual to guide a group to achieve same 
target and goal Hemphill and Coons (1987). Definitions of leadership are many and still 
many scholars attempt to define this concept distinctively. Leadership as an art to drive 
others to reach target and simultaneously intends to accomplish Kouze and Posner (1987). 
Leadership is the action of leader using specific approaches that motivate group to achieve 
projected target and those approach defines the leadership style (Hannagan 1995). Its 
essential for leaders to challenge the status and create future opportunity for the 
organization. Boehnker et al (2003) mentioned leadership is closely related to things how 
member of group feel and linked the things with substances, work and environment.        
Robbins (2001) defines leadership as an influence of leader on ability of group to meet the 
goal. Finally in all culture, the practice of leadership as a rule is valued to a certain extent.   
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3.4.3 Theoretical framework of leadership style 
Among all studies of competency leadership, the principle leadership style is the classic 
transaction-transformational type (transactional-transformational style of leadership derived 
by Burns and Bass) (Sashkin and Rosenbach 1993). Based on these two types of style, we 
will try to scrutinize different aspect and style of leadership.   
 
3.4.4 Theoretical framework of transactional style of leadership 
Transactional leaders give importance of the structure of initial interactive relationship 
among them and their subordinate, beside this underline the transaction between the leader 
and his associates. The transaction will be done on the basis of leaders clear message to the 
group of what is the essential and the condition and reward should clearly defined. When 
the group performs smoothly and subordinate accomplishes the target, performer must be 
rewarded (Bass and Avilio, 1994). The performance of capability of transactional leadership 
included the ability to achieve the assigned target, solve problem, make plan and organize. 
The leader must be efficient in good communication. In short, transactional leader expose a 
stable differentiate leadership style and as having been proved in many studies, emphasize 
the transactional-transformational leadership pattern. 
 
3.5.5 Theoretical framework of transformational leadership              
The famous administrative leadership and renowned scholar James MacGregor Burns 
(Burns, 1978) initiate the concept of transformational leadership style (Jabnoun and 
Al-Ghasyah, 2005). Burn proposed there are two type of leadership style namely; 
Transformational style (stressing the importance of change) and transactional (stressing the 
process and personnel) (Mason and Wetherbee, 2004). He explains rigorously the basic 
difference between these two types of leadership style and behavior. A transactional leader 
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valued reward contingency and relative rewards (Burns, 1978), while the transformation 
leader provided more opportunity to followers to develop the performance and modify the 
quality of skill ness to desire level of output, more like self-actualization (Maslaw 
1954).Bogler (2005) suggested in transformation style leaders and his subordinate 
stimulated each other to achieve higher moral and motive standards, where as in 
transactional style leader and his subordinate had their own separate target and each took 
part in transaction for their own interest (Burns 1978). 
     Relevant studies and evidence on the history of transformational leadership show that 
transformational leadership, like transactional leadership, is a stable and differentiated 
leadership behavior pattern capable of strengthen the transactional-transformational 
leadership model.                  
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Chapter Four 
 
4 Testable Hypotheses and Methodology 
4.1 Testable Hypotheses     
Government can influence public enterprise by controlling the appointment of directors and 
managers and also can influence the policy and objectives that management pursues (Ferner 
and colling 1991; 1993). According to Ferner (1998) negotiation and understanding in 
public sector enterprises are triangulation between Management, trade union and the 
government. The particular advantage of trade union for government is, it can be influence 
by government decision and politics. That is why SOEs are often highly unionized and 
characterized by the strong bargaining power of trade union. 
On the other hand the private sector can be expected to depoliticize trade 
union-management relationship and enhance the bargaining power of management (Earle et 
al. 1996). Private management is provided with greater autonomy by shareholder and free 
from political control and the focus of shareholders on wealth creation also provides 
management defined targets (Ferner and colling, 1993). Privatization is guided by market 
liberalization, technological advancement and economic regulation, the successive need to 
improve the performance and protect market with additional influence in negotiating with 
trade unions (Ferner and Colling 1993). This gives rise to the first research hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis H1: Privatization will provide an increase in the relative bargaining 
strength of management. 
 
Privatization has a positive impact of the firms efficiency, leading to enhanced performance, 
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decline the fiscal budget, reduce the government subsidies, enhance the income tax flow to the 
government and decrease in the public sectors stock of debts and borrowing requirements. This 
gives rise to the second research hypothesis:- 
 
Hypothesis H2: privatization leads to an improvement of firm’s net worth by 
increasing efficiency and reduction in the stock of debt by utilizing the sale proceeds to 
retire the debts.  
 
Competency model refers to the knowledge based management system in business unit and 
usually corporate parent using this competency. Corporate parent implies the level of 
management above that of the business unit. Corporate parent can take value adding 
activities in various way, among this the main three categories are Envisioning, Intervening, 
and providing central services. If the employees in private enterprise are not able to make 
sense what the corporate parent is, it is reality that they realize corporate centre is nothing 
more than the cost burden. Some times corporate parent prevent the employees from the 
realities of financial market by creating a financial safety net, that means that employees are 
completely ignore and does not know about the current position of the organization 
(asymmetry of information). This gives rise to the third research hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: By introducing competency model inside the organization we can 
develop the performance of management 
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4.2 Abstract of Testable Prediction 
Under mentioned table summarizes the hypotheses of privatization changes result. This also 
gives the definition of proxies for variables used in our analysis. When calculating ratios, 
we use nominal data in both numerator and denominator and used data in local currency in 
this analysis. 
 
Performance Measure         Definition                           Expected  
                                                               Change 
   
i. Profitability 
 IBTA    Income before tax/total sales  Increase 
 IBTS    Income before tax/sales   Increase 
 IBTE    Income before tax/equity   Increase 
ii. Capital Investment  
 CESA    Capital expenditure/sales   Increase 
 CETA    Capital expenditure/assets   Increase 
iii. Payout  
 DVSL    Cash dividend/sales   Increase 
 POUT    Cash dividend/income   Increase 
iv. Leverage   Total Debt/total asset   Decrease 
v. Employment   Number of employees   Decrease 
vi. Employee income  annual income per employee  Increase 
 
 
5. Methodologies 
The studies will conducted based on the secondary sources of information, published 
reports, articles and journal. The ratio analysis will be the basic tools of justifying the 
enterprise performance before and after privatization. In this case researcher investigation 
will try to find out the problems involved in different sector of industries and analysis their 
productivity and growth after privatization.  
     This method will help to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
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context. In this respect, the case enabled to gain access to various data sources, and to 
process an extensive variety of material, such as documents, artifact, and observations. The 
method also allowed having a systematic observation of the policies, people, structures and 
context of an organization. 
     Adopting a case the selection of a research site is a major concern and in view of the 
study’s final objective Bangladesh selected because a less-developed country and the author of 
this thesis is a Bangladeshi national. In this position it is easier for the researcher to approach 
the various authorities and firms.   
     The selection of the twenty case firms was conducted systematically on the basis of a 
number of criteria: the research objectives, accessibility of the firm, firm size, the 
composition of the firm’s ownership, the business in which the firm was engaged, a mixture 
of strong (successful) and weaker firms, and the number of years the firms stayed in 
operation after being privatized. The firms which are privatized by privatization board have 
been considered in this study, as because performance trend can not be observed for a 
longer time period.  
     Secondary data are extracted from company records, audited firm statements, 
statistical reports, books, journals, publications, business and investment plans of the case 
firms obtained from the website, and annual consumer index reports. Data obtained from 
sources other than the case firms included documents on privatization policies, government 
reports and regulations, newspaper publications on the progress of the privatization and 
purchase and sale agreements, reports of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank (WB).  
     This study will cover the time period between 1993 and 2010. The firm level analysis 
focused on determining whether the privatized case firms had indeed achieved the results as 
predicted with respect to improved MCS practices, firm performance, and the 
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implementation of business plans. In order to measure the performance of each firm, ratio 
analysis will be conducted. Through the ratio analysis, internal factors which affect the 
performance and efficiency of privatization firms would be identified. In addition to this, 
the impact of government policies and WB’s policies would be thoroughly analyzed to find 
out the effect of external factors. 
 
5.1 MNR model of Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborg  
Experimental literature suggested that when public enterprises were privatized their 
profitability enhance due to several reasons. Privatized enterprise is likely to be more profit 
oriented and less attention on social and political objectives. Managers are directly 
responsible to maximize the profit for shareholders. Profitability can increase efficiency and 
reduction of redundant labor, which was previously maintained by the politician for 
electoral reasons at the cost of firms (Boycko et al., 1996). Likewise, after privatization 
firms has scope to utilization of financial, technological and human resources more 
effectively due to huge pressure of profit target and more viable threats of bankruptcy and 
dismissal (Boycko et al., 1996). Furthermore, it is expected that output of privatization will 
increase due to better incentives, flexible financing and enormous opportunity of 
entrepreneurial activities (Megginson et al., 1994)             
     The theoretical model of BSV by Boycko, Schleifer and Vishny (1993) introduced 
the concept to determine post privatization performance of firms 
 Profitability after privatization 
 Its Operating efficiency 
 And Capital investment 
This model forecast a decrease in output, moreover on the basis of this BSV model 
Megginson et. al. (1994) studied 18 countries and 61 firms from 6 developing and 12 
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industrialized countries. They have analyzed the impact of privatization on firms 
profitability, capital structure and dividend policy, which was very significant for the post 
privatization performance. They have compared the performance of firm’s pre and post era 
and finally found a remarkable increase in firms 
 Profitability 
 Proper utilization of resource 
 Firms output 
 Capital expenditure of sales 
 Dividend payout 
They have also found there was a significant change and decline in firms 
 Government subsidiary 
 Leverage 
 And capital expenditure of total asset 
In our study we used Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborg method 
 
5.2  Theoretical concept of MNR model of Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborg 
Variable         Proxies                               Expected relationship       
V(1)Profitability   i. ROS (return on sales)=net income/sales       ROSo>ROS1 
    ii. ROA (return on asset)=net income/total assets  ROAo>ROA1 
   iii. ROE (Return on equity)=net income/equity     ROEo>ROE1   
V(2) Capital       i. CESA (capital expenditure to sales)=   CESAo>CESA1 
Investment        Capital expenditure/sales 
    ii. CETA (capital expenditure to assets)=  CETAo>CETA1 
 Capital expenditure/total asset   
V(3) Leverage   i. LEV1 (Debt to asset)=   LEVo>LEV1 
      Total Debt/Total asset 
V(4) Payout   i. DVSL (Dividend to sale)=   DVSLo>DVSL1 
      Cash dividend/sales 
    ii. POUT (Dividend payout)=   POUTo>POUT1 
       Cash dividend/Net income    
Where o implies the time period of 2008 and 1 is for 2010. 
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5.3  Application of MNR Model 
This section was discussed how we would use and apply the MNR method to determine the 
post privatization performance of firms. This method of measurement implemented in few 
steps, which is mentioned in Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborg (199). The first step of 
MNR method is to determined performance variables of all sample companies for few years 
pre and post privatization data. Due to lack of data we constructed the performance 
measures for the last three (03) years data of the case firms. Three years before data 
considered as base data and compared the analysis of recent data with three years before 
data. 
     In second step, we will use Wilcoxon signed rank test as the main method of testing 
for remarkable changes in the performance variable. By using the post privatization data, 
the Wilcoxon signed rank sum test is simply the non parametric version of a paired t-test.  
 
6 Empirical results by using MNR method 
In this section we presented and discussed rigorously about empirical result for full same of 
20 privatized enterprises (presented in table 5.1), and one sub-sample (presented in table 
6.1). Table 6.1 summarized the empirical result for sample comprising of 20 enterprise 
privatized by privatization board from 1993 to 2010. In this practice, we compared the average 
operating and financial performance of these firms after privatization and compared data of last 
three years. 
For each proxy, we used the number of observation, the mean and median of the variables, and 
Z-statistics of Wilcoxon signed rank test, which was the test of considerable change in median 
value. In addition to Wilcoxon test, this exercise also employed the proportion test and last 
column of table gave us the result of percentage of firms that performed in a way we expect 
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together with the p-value of the proportion test. We calculated ratios by using the nominal data 
in both the numerator and denominator and all data used hare for analysis in local currency. 
Table  6.1 Result of full samples from test of prediction  
Fig. Million Taka 
 No Mean 
before 
(2008) 
Mean 
After 
(2010) 
Variation 
of mean 
Z-statistics of 
Wilcoxon 
signed ranks 
test 
% of firms that 
changed as 
predict 
  Median Median Median   
PROFITABILITY 
ROA 20 0.0240 0.0486 0.0246 5.028 70% 
  0.0167 0.0370 0.0203   
ROS 20 0.0114 0.0416 0.0302 6.019 76% 
  0.0125 0.030 0.0165   
ROE 20 0.0862 0.0975 0.0113 4.391 73% 
  0.0571 0.1242 0.0671   
OPERATING EFFICIENCY 
Sales 20 287.1539 398.1678 111.0139 5.072 73% 
  95.9649 132.9989 37.034   
Income 
before tax 
20 4.1998 9.1995 4.9997 6.658 78% 
  1.3298 4.1018 2.772   
OUTPUT 
Real sales 20 80999.89 95187.37 14187.48 3.465 67% 
  24775.89 22590.56 -2185.33   
LEVERAGE   
Ratio 20 0.4988 0.6102 0.1104 4.944 56% 
  0.5217 0.6411 0.1194   
EMPLOYMENT 
Total 20 337.0398 286.1249 -50.9149 -3.901 68% 
  181 122.8997 -58.1003   
Labor 
welfare 
20 12.7021 16.5587 3.8549 7.268 83% 
  11.0369 14.6501 3.6132   
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6.1 Profitability Changes  
In our study, profitability was measured by using three ratios, return on sales (ROS), known as 
commercial profitability, return on assets (ROA), similar to economic profitability and return on 
equity (ROE) called financial profitability. In calculation of these three ratios we used income 
before tax in the numerator in stead of net income because as per policy of Bangladesh, 
privatized firms were enjoining income tax exemption facilities up to certain period of time. Not 
only this, privatized firms can borrow money from states bank with the lower rate of interest as 
similar to the SOEs. The government under certain circumstance writes off all or part of bad 
debts incurred by the SOEs to motivate and to enhance the performance of firm’s profitability.  
We found, profitability of firms after privatization increased significantly in terms of ROA, 
ROS and ROE for full sample. After privatization mean of ROA increase 2.5%, from 2.4% to 
4.9%. Moreover, 70% of firms are able to enhance their profit margin after privatization. 
Likewise, after privatization ROS increased 3.0%, from 1.14% to 4.16% of total asset and 76% 
firms able to enhanced profit margin. The mean of ROE increased by 1% from 8.6% to 9.8% 
and the median increased 6.7%, from 5.7% to 12.4%. The Wilcoxon test showed that the median 
of this profitability changed positively at the one percent level.      
 
6.2 Efficiency Change 
To calculate efficiency first we adjust the inflation and use the income before tax per employee. 
After privatization both mean and median were changed considerably and sales per employee 
for 2009 was 286 million taka and for 2010 399 million taka. Income before tax per employee 
for 2009 was 4,26 million taka for 2010 was 9.29 million taka, which was more than double. 
Moreover, sales efficiency increased 73% whereas income efficiency increased 78%, both 
appreciably at one percent level. Clearly these were very dramatic gain of post privatization 
efficiency.  
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6.3 Changes in output (real sales) 
In our calculation we used the inflation adjustment of sales as an output measure of firm. 
Wilcoxon test showed real sales increase after privatization and the change is at the one percent 
level. Wilcoxon test implied the real sales increased significantly from 81,062.39 million in 
2008 to 95,316.26 million in 2010 and 67% of firms increased in real sales, which was 
considerably at one percent level. Moreover, the output of median remains stable and was a little 
decrease of amounting 2,211. 
 
6.4 Leverage Change 
In our study we defined change in leverage as the ratio of change in total debt to total assets. In 
compares with the result of other study (D`Souza and Megginson 2000; Megginson, Nash and 
Randenborgh 1994), Wilcoxon test in this study showed a considerably change in leverage and 
increased significantly for privatized firms. The leverage of firm increased from mean of 50% in 
2008 to 61% in 2010 and the test also exposed that 56% of firms increase in their leverage ratio. 
The main reason for difference between the result of our study and the others empirical study 
that as per Bangladesh privatization policy the privatized firms were still treated as SOEs by 
many state-owned commercial banks. Moreover privatization laws and regulation allows 
privatized firms to enjoy the SOEs status for several years (such as tax exemption and loan 
facilities with lower rate of interest as SOEs). Finally even with government debt guarantee, the 
cost of borrowing fund for privatized firms may not increase significantly.  
 
6.5 Employment and employment welfare changes 
The analysis of this part of our study authenticated our expectation about the reduction of 
surplus employees after privatization. The Wilcoxon test implies a significant decrease in the 
average employment, from 337 in 2008 to 286 in 2010, that means 51 employees reduction per 
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enterprise. The proportion test also showed that 68% of firms reduced the employment, which 
was considerably at one percent level.  
In sequence with reduction of employment implied the increase in employment welfare. The 
labor welfare determined increase from 11.04 in 2008 to 14.65 in 2010, which means an 
increase of 4 million per employee. Moreover 83% of firms reported enhance in their 
employment welfare. 
It is mentioned that the changes exhibit by Wilcoxon test was statistically important and change 
in the median was in parallel direction and with the alike significant in the mean.             
 
7. Verify performances Difference in difference (DID) method 
7.1 Methodology 
The relative method compared the firm’s performances after the privatization. The main 
problem of this method is that it is unable to segregate internal and external economic factors 
and its impact on privatized firm’s performance. In other word, performance of firms can be 
measured in different ways (as determined by ROA, ROE and ROS for instance). Hence, to 
evaluate the impact of privatization on financial performance of firms needed to separate the 
impact of privatization from other factors. So, there are two dimensions of comparison. The first 
is to compare the difference between two groups of firms, privatized and non-privatized. It is 
the difference across the category and the second comparison is the difference between before 
and after the privatization, this is the difference in course of time.    
     First, we started to build up a control group consisting of SOEs that will be not subject to 
privatized, so that, we can check the pre and post privatization performance of firms and will be 
able to verify result of the control group by compared result obtained from the treatment group 
(privatized firm). 
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     Second, we compared the difference in performance measured of the treatment group to 
the different of performance measures of the control group. In our study, the reference period 
was 2008 and 2010. First we determined the performance of each sample firms in the treatment 
group (for year 2008 & 2010), after that, we calculated difference in performance of all firms in 
the treatment groups. The same procedure will be applied for the control groups. 
     Third, in the next step we determined the differences of performance of these two groups 
and it is the step gives the name difference in difference (DID) method. 
 
7.2 The control sample          
First we selected the firms which yet remain 100% state owned enterprise. Now for each firm in 
the treatment group, we needed to find a counterpart firm in the set of SOEs, which will 
composite the control group. We did this task by differentiating firms in both set of SOEs and 
treatment group according three criteria, specifically industrial sector, geographical position and 
size for firms. Next for each treatment group, we selected SOE that best matched the 
corresponding firm in treatment group. Similarly we can say that the selected SOE must be in 
the, same geographical region, homogeneous sector and similar size of the corresponding firm 
in treatment group.  
     Repeating the same procedure for all firms in the treatment group, we composite the 
control group that includes 8 SOEs which best matched the characteristics of the corresponding 
firms in treatment group before privatization.  
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Table 7.1 Description of two groups 
 
 Employee Salaries Assets Sales revenues 
Control 
Group 
Min 20 120.40 1120 280 
Max 5810 149967 910436.6 632338.6 
Mean 330.02 4498.07 45178.86 63848.50 
Treatment 
Group 
Min 30 98 332 214 
Max 5805 159978 484866 1366813 
Mean 340.38 4480.50 26768.70 59122.70 
 
7.3 Result of DID method 
The result of DID are shown in table 6.2. In case of treatment group all performance measures 
increase after privatization. There is average ROA increase of 2.7% after privatization, rises 
from 2.4% to 4.9% and the same thing for ROS rises from 1.14% to 4.2% that means an 
increase by 3.02% point. Similarly ROE after privatization is 9.75% in comparison to before 
8.62% and an average increase of 1.13%. Productivity is changed powerfully; sales efficiency 
rises from BDT 287.15 million to BDT 398.16 million per employee, an increase of BDT 
111.02 million per employee. Profit increases from BDT 4.12 million to BDT 9.19 million per 
employee and average growth of BDT 4.99 million per employee after privatization. Moreover, 
leverage ratio does not change significantly. On the other hand, we notice that performance 
enhancement is average as well as in median and ROE rises from 5.7% to 12.42% and an 
average growth of 6.71% after privatization. 
     During the same period firms in the control group, profitability of SOEs declines and in 
some cases diminishes. Moreover, its productivity enhances considerably. We found in the 
control group that ROA of firms before and after (the same period) privatization was 2.15% and 
1.55%, a slight fall of 0.61%, the commercial profitability ROS before and after privatization 
was -0.05% and 0.19%, a little rise of 0.24%. The financial profitability ROE rises from 2.71% 
to 3.82%, and average increase of 1.11%, where as is median, there is an average fall of 0.05% 
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and decreases from 4.40% to 4.45%. On the other hand, sales per employee rises from BDT 
300.13 million to 449.99 million and in median its changes from BDT 88 to 109.69 million, 
namely a rise of 21.69 million per employee. The profitability per employee increases by BDT 
3.28 million from 3.11 million to BDT 6.39 million. However, in median profit per employee 
remains same level at BDT 1 million. On the average, the leverage raised by 16.3% from 
62.01% to 78.31% and the median leverage ratio raised by 14%. 
     From the result of evaluation performance of each group for the same time period having 
controlled the characteristics of firms in two groups, we have seen the difference in performance 
change of each group to privatization. We found that the performance of privatize firms 
improves better than SOEs in terms of profitability and productivity. The control group shows 
only better performance in average sales per employee and leverage ratio. From this result we 
can conclude that privatization has made it possible to improve performance of firms in a 
statistical significant way.    
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THE IMPACT OF PRIVATIZATION ON PERFORMANCE OF 
PRIVATIZED FIRMS IN BANGLADESH 
 
 
Table 7.2 Summary result of DID method 
 Treatment Group Control Group   
Measure of 
performance 
N Mean 
(Median) 
2008 
Mean 
(Median) 
2010 
Difference 
In Mean 
(Median) 
N Mean 
(Median) 
2008 
Mean 
(Median) 
2010 
Difference 
In Mean 
(Median) 
DID 
between 
two 
group 
Z-statis
tics for 
DID 
PROFITABILITY  
ROA 20 0.0240 0.0486 0.0246 8 0.0215 0.0155 -0.006 0.0306 0.000 
  0.0167 0.0370 0.0203  0.0098 0.0074 -0.0024 0.0227  
ROS 20 0.0114 0.0416 0.0302 8 -0.0005 0.0019 0.0024 0.0278 0.000 
  0.0125 0.030 0.0165  0.0096 0.0069 -0.0027 0.0192  
ROE 20 0.0862 0.0975 0.0113 8 0.0271 0.0382 0.0111 0.0002 0.000 
  0.0571 0.1242 0.0671  0.0440 0.0445 0.0005 0.0666  
EFFICIENCY  
Sales 20 287.1539 398.1678 111.0139 8 300.1356 449.9990 149.8634 -38.8495 0.347 
  95.9649 132.9989 37.034  88.0032 109.6898 21.6866 15.3474  
Profit 20 4.1998 9.1995 4.9997 8 3.1145 6.3990 3.2845 1.7152 0.000 
  1.3298 4.1018 2.772  0.9899 1.0598 0.0699 2.7021  
INDEBTEDNESS  
Leverage ratio 20 0.4988 0.6102 0.1104 8 0.6201 0.7831 0.163 -0.0526 0.108 
  0.5217 0.6411 0.1194  0.6199 0.7599 0.140 -0.0206  
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Chapter Five 
8. Discussion  
8.1 Distinguish between different phases of privatization 
A study of the performance of privatized firms (divested during 1980s) has been done by World 
Bank (1993) and reported that nearly 50 percent of firms has been closed down. This study 
shows 245 firms out of 497 small and medium industrial enterprise has been shout down. A 
useless asset base, high debt liabilities and lack of good governance are mentioned the cause for 
poor performance of divest firms.       
8.1.1 Type of industrial enterprises privatized during 1972-1996 
Type of enterprise        No of enterprise privatized in different period 
   1972-75 1975-81  1981-86  1991-96     Total 
Rice & flour mills     20    21     8     -       49 
Vegetable oil mills     5    21    12     -       38 
Food products      -     5     3     -           8 
Cold storage      -     7     5     -          12 
Sugar & food      -     -     -     1           1 
Textile      11    21    27     6          65 
Jute products      -     9    35     -          44 
Wood products      3     9     -     -          12 
Rubber products      -    16     1     -          17 
Tanneries & bones      -    25     5     -          30 
Chemicals      4     -     -     4          8 
Soap & chemicals      -     7    12     -          19 
Glass & optical        -     3     1     -           4 
Paper & printing      8     7     2     -          17 
Steel mills     12     8    10     2          32 
Metal works      7    25     5     -          37 
Film       -     3     1     -           4 
Hotels       -     2     1     -           3 
Trading       -     3     6     -           9 
Others      50    63    88     -         201 
Total     120   255   222     13        610 
Source: Report of ILO (1999), Adapted from Privatization in Bangladesh by Momtaz Udin Ahmed 
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Source: Report of ILO (1999), Adapted from Privatization in Bangladesh by Momtaz Udin Ahmed  
 
8.1.2 Performance of privatized firms before establishment of PB 
Report of Binayak Sens survey (1997) of privatized firms in Bangladesh 
Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) conducted a survey performance of 
privatized firms in Bangladesh, under the direction of Binayak Sen (1997) and catalogues the 
post privatization performance status of 205 firms. Sen Analyzed and showed the current status 
of those firms (divested from 1979 to 1994) before the establishment of PB in terms of either 
being in operation or closed down after privatization. A key finding is that there is a 
mentionable change in partnership of owner and around 26 percent of firms ownership has 
changed and presently holding by new owner. Out of 205 firms listed in the survey, 40 percent 
of firms have closed (83 firms are reported as closed) down and 55 percent (112 firms) of firms 
in operation. Sahota et. al (1991) reported that the rate of shutdown of firms in manufacturing 
sector is 20 percent that means for every five firms one shuts down. 5 percent (10 firms) firms 
are found to be non-existing in the market and presumed have been liquidated. Among the 
operating 112 firms 40 percent (44 firms) firms are producing different product than what they 
produce before privatization. On the other hand, among 83 closed firm, Sens survey reported 
 52 
that 30 percent (28 firms) firms engaged in alternative businesses (trading, services) and 70 
percent (65 firms) reported as inactive.         
     Similarly, the above study mentioned that capacity utilization below 75 percent in 36 
percent (40 firms) firms out of 112 firms and 64 percent firms capacity utilization is above 75 
percent.  
 
8.1.3 Privatization of SOEs by Privatization Board   
Since the establishment of the Privatization Board (The Privatization Commission) in 1993, a 
total of 74 enterprises have been privatized. Out of this, 44 enterprises were privatized by 
outright sale and 20 by offloading of shares, 8 enterprises were transferred to the ownership of 
the worker and employees’ association and the remaining two were handed over to Bangladesh 
Army and Navy. An amount of Tk. 709.9 crore has been deposited to the Government 
exchequer as sale proceeds of the enterprises.    
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8.1.4 Result of testing World Bank Claims by Shahzad Uddin, 2005 
(Conditions 54 firms privatized by sale of ownership) 
Another survey was done in the sample group of 13 companies out of 54 firms which is 
privatized by sale of ownership and reported that each privatization sale was to a family. So the 
family capitalism may experience with different output than western institutional ownership in 
professional salaried managers. Observation in sampled privatized firms supported such claim. 
The principal-agent relationship was in a complex manner among those firms. For some 
principal became agents of the firms by holding the majority of share and had captured the 
control, finally become the top managers. The principal-agent relationship is in complex model 
dynamically for the privatized listed firms. As minority shareholders of those firms became 
powerless to secured sound statutory information (Shahzad Uddin, 2005).     
     The growth of industrial sector has faced a serious decline of 45 per cent from the peak of 
FY2005-06 till now. But the growth rate of this sector is decreasing day by day shown in Figure  
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8.1.5 Findings of our study (20 firms), privatized by IPO 
Privatization started in Bangladesh after 1972 it’s a long history but my concern is after 
establishment of privatization board (PB). PB handles 74 enterprises and the method of 
privatization was divided into two ways. 
1.      sales of ownership (54 firms) & 
2.      Issue of IPO (Initial public offer) through stock exchange (20 firms) 
 
8.5.1 Issue of IPO 
At the time of data analysis, we have founded that post privatization performance of 20 firms 
increased in terms of Profitability (ROA, ROE, ROS), sales, income & leverage etc. All those 
variables are positive in MNR method and as well as in DID method. Those firms did better 
because of their stakeholders and shareholders. At the time of AGM (Annual General Meeting) 
they have to satisfy their shareholders and board of director (BOD), similarly to stakeholders. 
Moreover, regulatory body security exchange commission (SEC) watching the market 
continuously, if the share price fall down they notice to the authority to follow up the 
performance of firms. As a result post privatization performance of those firms increase. 
 
8.5.2 Sale of ownership 
On the other hand, enterprises privatized by sale of ownership are not doing better due to lack of 
good governance in management & poor monitoring system. As per policy of government and 
privatization board those firms enjoying the loan facilities with lower rate of interest similar to 
SOEs and availing tax rebate up to a certain period of time. That is why they are availing a huge 
amount of loan facility and divert that fund to different business. A large amount of asset but 
they reduce manpower to save the expenditure for their own interest, finally whole assets are 
unutilized. Especially there is no regulatory body to follow up the performance of privatized 
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firms. In these circumstances, we can say that if privatization board takes the necessary action to 
sale SOEs by issue of IPO, it will bring the success of privatization in Bangladesh. 
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8.2 Comparison of firms privatized by issue of IPO & Non 
IPO) 
8.21  CCCG privatized by sale of shares through SEC (Security Exchange Commission)  
Chittagong Cement Clinker Grinding Company was partially privatized in the year of 1988 and 
became a listed public limited company by sold its 51% government holding of shares in May 
1992 and its became fully privatized. It is the biggest grinding cement mill has monopolistic 
power in the growing market of cement in Bangladesh.  
     The World Bank reported that Chittagong Cement Clinker Grinding Company was in 
profitable during the partial and full eras of privatization. In 1998-99 the CCCG achieved profit 
target of Tk. 95.02 million which was 111% of its target and the financial performance of CCCG 
enhanced significantly under the private ownership. Between 1995-96 and 1992-93, sales 
revenue of the company increased by 64% and the production of the company enhanced by 40%. 
An expansion program has been undertaken by the company to enhance its production with a 
forecasting of triple production capacity by January 1999 and that is why CCCG became the 
largest cement manufacturer in the country”. 
     The finding of our study is very much similar to those reports of the World Bank and 
CCCG is one of the most successful privatized companies in Bangladesh. After privatization, 
sales of the company rose by more than two times, profit increased by nine times and ROA 
enhanced almost four times. CCCG’s market shares with a face value of Tk.100 raised at Tk. 
1071.25 on November 3, 2001, which was remarkably high  and satisfactory as per to SEC 
records. 
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8.2 EBCM privatized by sale of ownership 
Eagle Box & Carton Manufacturing Company was formed as private company in the year of 
1961 to produce packaging materials for industrial and commercial purpose. It was became 
nationalized company in 1972 and privatized in the year of 1998 as a public limited company. It 
was profitable in public era as SOE. A tender was invited for the government shares in 1992 and 
the company was sold and in December 1994, handed over to the successful bidders, a family.  
The World Bank Claimed that the annual turnover of the company fallen by 20% “Between 
1994 and 1995 and sales revenues of the company dropped by 25% and that is why losses 
occurred and increased extremely. The new owners after privatization reduced 25% of the 
employees to enhance the efficiency and lower costs. The newly privatized companies carried 
out huge repair and reorganized projects to reestablish the dynamic capacity and were 
introducing development programs to converse the loss-making trend to the company with 
anticipation that they would expect to see the profits in the near future”. 
Eagle Box & Carton Manufacturing reduced its employee in a substantial way and reduced 
expenses by cutting workers’ wages. The company account discloses that since a substantial 
number of employees and labor were casually or informally appointed. The trade union 
stimulated and influenced upon management and were almost absent under private ownership 
and as casual workers they were not allowed to be members of trade unions. 
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9. Limitations of the study 
During the time of this study the researcher has found that it was very difficult to get data access 
of the company. The company owners and management of the firm did not appeared to 
recognize the benefits to be increased from the result of this research and was therefore very 
much reluctant to disclose their company data. Finally, as a result, the limited number of 
privatized company the researcher studied during this study period. Owners and managers of the 
company could be made more conscious of the advantages and benefit of the participation in 
research studies by the delivery of information and training to them. This kind of training could 
also be conducted at the type of data suitable for sharing with scholars. Additionally, the data 
sufficiency of data bank and information of the ministry of Trade and commerce was incomplete. 
Another major problem was to get the data and information regarding the pre-privatization era, 
as well as it was difficult to find out respondents who could gave information and statistics on 
the governance practices in the public ownership period. For example, In the case of any 
company of privatized firm, the researcher failed to manage and find out accounting and 
financial staff or members who had also worked with the firm during the public and private 
ownership period. Moreover, the case firms of my study had not kept their pre-privatization 
financial and statistical records especially in the balance sheet in website, and the information 
which they provided through website was incomplete. In some cases, it was very difficult and 
complicated the valuation of issues such as leverage, taxes, capital investment and past 
employment trends etc. 
     There is very little literature that discus and explains the governance practices from the 
perspective of companies in the less developed countries (LDCs). There is not available much 
literature about the impact of governance change system on firms performance in the context of 
privatization in less developed countries. Research of this study dealing with the topic includes 
 59 
studies conducted in Vietnam and Pakistan and the scope of these studies is much limited. The 
researcher of this study tried to make comparison the findings with those of the former studies. 
But found that as yet no similar studies in this filed have been done in Bangladeshi firms. Most 
of the studies has done and analyzed the governance practice change have been conducted in the 
West. The majority of these researches do not pay much specific care to the way the same 
methods are used after a change in ownership. The researcher of this study thus had no 
considerable experimental indication to compare my findings with. This survey of study efforts 
to make a link between the impact of contextual factors and governance practices changes of 
company activities and its performance. It has become obvious that this relationship is complex 
and the researcher of this study realizes that this research field still has needed a great deal of 
investigation. Therefore more experimental findings have to be collected by similar case studies. 
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10. Conclusion  
This paper studied the impact of changes of corporate governance in post privatization 
performance of 20 privatized enterprises in Bangladesh. Two approaches have been used to 
identify and analysis the issue.  
     The first approach used the MNR methodology, we applied the Wilcoxon signed rank test 
to compare the data of privatized enterprise and its financial and operating performance of firms 
before and after the privatization. The result of this study showed a major change and 
improvement in most measure of performance, namely productivity, profitability and employees 
welfare. 
     The second approach used the DID method to address the shortcoming of the MNR 
method, which we apply to analyze the post privatization data of firms performance. We used 
this test because the MNR methodology was not able to analysis the data perfectly due to data 
availability of the pre privatization era. The DID approach compared privatized enterprises (a 
treatment group) to SOEs which are still run by the state ownership (a control group) to 
highlight the intrinsic impact of the privatization. Similar to the first approach, the DID test also 
ensured that privatization brought about a significant change and improvement in performance. 
     This paper also investigated the impact of the governance on the corporate management 
and agency problem due to the information asymmetry. 
     First the privatization tended to bring an important change in the ownership structure of 
firms. We were able to identify the negative correlation between the government remaining 
ownership in privatized enterprise and their performance improvement. In particular, privatized 
firms of which the government held company shares by less than 51% able to enhance 
profitability more than the enterprise of which the government held more than 51% shares.                       
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Second by introducing competency leadership, management personnel change associated with 
the privatization proved to be important with respect to the performance improvement. 
Privatized firms with new managers improved their performance much more than those which 
were still run by old key managers. Although the old managers posed good knowledge of 
enterprises and maintained the relationship with government’s apparatus, they were less 
dynamic when it came to enterprise restructuring.  
     Competition is one of the major reasons to push firms to improve their performance and 
in this case the competency leadership plays an important role. Our study found that the 
competency leadership resulted from the opening to foreign markets and more developed 
geographical location in domestic market, which had positive impact on the performance of 
privatized firms. 
Finally, we found that privatized firms were still dependent of nationalized bank as the source of 
funding for their activities. This result was verified by the facts that in general, the leverage ratio 
of firms increased considerably after the privatization.                   
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